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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH ALEXANDER DANCA,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48316-2020
Twin Falls County Case No.
CR42-17-1710

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Joseph Alexander Danca failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence?
ARGUMENT
Danca Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Officers responded to Danca’s home following a report of a possible suicide. (PSI, p.4.)

Officers found Danca inside unresponsive and surrounded by several cans of beer and bottles of
vodka. (Id.) Danca eventually got up but refused to cooperate with EMS. (Id.) He claimed to
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have ingested a handful of trazadone and vodka. (Id.) Danca also threatened to “blow [his] head
off” with a gun. (Id.) Officers placed Danca into protective custody and transported him to the
hospital. (Id.) Danca repeatedly spit on one of the officers transporting him to the hospital. (Id.)
At the hospital, Danca kicked another officer in the left shoulder and back area. (Id.) A blood
draw revealed Danca had a blood alcohol concentration of .222. (Id.)
The state charged Danca with battery on a police officer. (R., pp.23-24.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Danca pled guilty. (R., pp.27-28, 68-70.) The court imposed a unified sentence
of three years, with one year determinate. (R., pp.67-72.) The court suspended Danca’s sentence
and placed him on probation for a period of three years. (R., p.71.)
Approximately two and a half years later, the state filed a motion to revoke probation. (R.,
pp.67, 89-100.) The state alleged that Danca violated the terms and conditions of his probation by
committing the new crime of DUI, by consuming alcohol, and by failing to appear for drug testing
as required. (R., p.90.) Danca admitted to all three violations. (R., p.109.) The district court
revoked Danca’s probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.111-12; Tr., p.11, Ls.611.) Danca timely appealed. (R., pp.111, 115-18.)
On appeal, Danca asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and imposed the underlying sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) Review of the record
and proper application of the relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Court “review[s] a district court’s decision to revoke probation under an abuse of

discretion standard.” State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citation omitted). The Court “reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by determining whether the
trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
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boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v.
Smith, 168 Idaho 463, ___, 483 P.3d 149, 1006, 1019 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).
C.

Danca Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Danca’s probation. “The

purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper
control and supervision” while also providing adequate protection for society. State v. Mummert,
98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977); State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho 725, 726, 769 P.2d 602,
603 (Ct. App. 1989). “If the trial judge reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that
probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, probation may be revoked.” State v. Peterson,
123 Idaho 49, 50-51, 844 P.2d 31, 32-33 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
Probation is not meeting the objective of rehabilitation and is not providing adequate
protection for society where the defendant repeatedly violates the conditions of probation and
commits new crimes. See, e.g., State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276-77, 899 P.2d 985, 986-87 (Ct.
App. 1995) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “society was at risk if
[the probationer] remained at large” and “probation had not been successful in fostering
rehabilitation” as shown by defendant’s “commission of a new theft”); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho
324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the district court properly revoked probation
because “probation . . . was not working” and “continued probationary status would endanger the
public” where the defendant violated conditions of probation and “committed the same type of
offense” while on probation); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding the district court properly revoked probation because “this was the third violation
of probation” and the defendant “had continued to engage in counterproductive acts”).
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In determining whether the trial court properly revoked probation, the Court “examines all
the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the
sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and
the revocation of probation.” State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Ct. App.
1998). The “focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke
probation.” State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).
Here, the district court appropriately revoked Danca’s probation and executed the
underlying sentence because he repeatedly violated the terms of his probation and committed the
new crime of DUI. Danca was placed on probation in October of 2017. (R., pp.67-74; see R.,
pp.79, 84.) Shortly thereafter, Danca tested positive for alcohol twice during random urinalysis
testing and once after being admitted to the hospital. (R., pp.78-79.) Consequently, the district
court ordered him to serve thirty additional days of discretionary jail time. (R., pp.80-81.)
Approximately six month later, Danca signed a written admission declaring that he was
still consuming alcohol. (R., pp.83-84.) According to Danca’s clinician, he was consuming half
a quart of vodka each day. (R., p.84.) Additionally, Danca submitted to just one random urinalysis
test between December 20, 2018 and April 23, 2019, despite being required to submit to three
random tests per month. (Id.) Notably, Danca also underwent two mental health evaluations. (Id.)
Both evaluators recommended that he continue substance abuse treatment. (Id.) Notwithstanding
the recommendations, Danca did not participate in any further treatment. (Id.) It is unclear from
the record whether the court imposed any sanctions as a result of this series of probation violations.
(See generally, R.) In any event, Danca’s continued alcohol consumption and failure to participate
in treatment demonstrate his unwillingness to take advantage of his probation and the rehabilitative
opportunities it afforded to him.
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After repeatedly violating his probation and failing to maintain sobriety, Danca committed
a DUI. (R., pp.91-98) He drove to a store while intoxicated and nearly struck the building while
attempting to park his car. (R., p.94.) He then backed up and parked sideways in the parking stall.
(Id.) Danca entered the store and was so intoxicated that he could not walk straight. (Id.) He
attempted to purchase alcohol but was refused service, which caused him to become belligerent.
(Id.) Danca hit the curb and nearly collided with a parked vehicle as he backed up. (R., p.95.) As
he drove away, he hit another curb, drove on the sidewalk of the building nearly striking a store
employee. (Id.) After exiting the parking lot, Danca nearly struck an oncoming vehicle. (Id.)
When an officer activated his overhead lights to stop Danca, he pulled into a gas station parking
lot and rear ended a parked car. (Id.) Astonishingly, just three days after being charged with DUI,
Danca again tested positive for alcohol during a residence verification performed by a probation
officer, and he admitted that he had not been submitting to urinalysis testing as required. (R.,
pp.91-93.)
The district court properly considered whether probation was serving its intended purpose
of rehabilitation and whether revoking probation was consistent with protecting society. (See
- - Tr.,
p.10, L.15 – p.12, L.9.) In light of the nature of Danca’s repeated probation violations and the fact
that he committed a new crime while on probation, the court sensibly concluded that probation
was “clearly … not meeting its rehabilitative goals” and that Danca posed “a risk to the
community.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-5.) Because probation was neither serving its intended purpose of
rehabilitation nor adequately protecting society, the court reasonably determined that “continued
probation would not be appropriate.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-3.) The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it revoked Danca’s probation and executed the underlying sentence because it
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acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Danca has failed to show otherwise.
Danca argues that “the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and
executing his underlying sentence without modification.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) According
to Danca, the court should have followed his recommendation for a more lenient sentence because
(1) he was close to completing his period of probation, (2) he recognized his alcohol abuse
problem, and (3) he recognized his mental health issues. (Appellant’s brief, p.4; see Tr., p.8, L.24
– p.10, L.2.) Danca’s argument is unavailing for several reasons.
First, Danca has cited no authority supporting his contention that a trial court abuses its
discretion by revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence when the probationer’s
term of probation is nearing completion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) Thus, this argument is
without basis in law, and the Court should not consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263,
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.”) As shown, the district court properly
considered Danca’s conduct on probation and reasonably concluded that probation had not served
its rehabilitative purpose and that execution of the underlying sentence was necessary for the
protection of society.
Second, the district court by no means ignored Danca’s substance abuse problem. To the
contrary, the court’s decision to revoke probation was based primarily on the fact that Danca had
failed to adequately treat his severe substance abuse issues while on probation and thus repeatedly
violated the terms and conditions of his probation. (Tr., p.10, L.15 – p.11, L.5.) Indeed, Danca’s
pattern of behavior while on probation demonstrated his unwillingness to address his underlying
alcohol problem. (See R., pp.79, 84, 89-100.) Moreover, the court considered the PSI and Danca’s
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criminal history in advance of the revocation hearing, which revealed that Danca has several DUI
convictions and a pernicious alcohol addiction. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-25; PSI, pp.5-35.)
Third, the district court adequately considered Danca’s mental health issues. Again, the
district court reviewed the history of the case, including the presentence report in determining
whether to revoke Danca’s probation. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-25.) The PSI shows that the underlying
charges in this case stem from an apparent suicide attempt. (PSI, p.4.) Additionally, the progress
reports filed with the court show that Danca was hospitalized following another failed suicide
attempt during his first year of probation. (R., p.79.) Not long thereafter, Danca’s neighbors
observed him lying under his vehicle inhaling exhaust fumes in an attempt to end his life. (R.,
p.84.) Additionally, Danca self-reported that he was “depressed about life” and had suicidal
ideations about suffocating himself with a plastic bag. (Id.) As a result, he was transported to
Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center for observation. (Id.) Beyond the information reviewed
by the court in advance of the revocation hearing, both the prosecutor and Danca’s attorney brought
Danca’s mental health issues to the court’s attention during the hearing. (Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.10,
L.1.) Thus, the district adequately considered Danca’s mental health before revoking his probation
and executing the sentence.
Finally, the district court correctly treated Danca’s request for a modification of his
sentence “as a Rule 35 motion and a request for leniency.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.13-15.) The court
reasonably denied the request based on Danca’s conduct on probation (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-20), and
because it felt that his underlying sentence “was already fairly lenient” given his criminal history
(Id.; see
- PSI, pp.5-10). Furthermore, the court noted that it had ordered Danca be given credit for
time served and that he would be eligible for parole in less than one year. (Tr., p.11, L.6 – p.12,
L.1.) Perhaps most importantly, however, Danca waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion seeking
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leniency in his sentence by accepting the terms of the plea agreement offered by the state. (R.,
p.28.) Thus, Danca was barred from seeking such a reduction in his underlying sentence.
Accordingly, Danca has failed to show that the district court erred in revoking his probation and
executing the underlying sentence without modification.
In sum, the court’s decision to revoke Danca’s probation and execute the underlying
sentence was a reasonable exercise of the court’s discretion, and Danca has failed to show
otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 25th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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